Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing when Enforcement is a Decision Variable

Societies provide institutions that are costly to set up, but able to enforce long-run relationships. We study the optimal decision problem of using self-governance for risk sharing or governance through enforcement provided by these institutions. Third-party enforcement is modelled as a costly technology that consumes resources, but permits the punishment of agents who deviate from ex-ante specified allocations. We show that it is optimal to employ the technology whenever commitment problems prevent first-best risk sharing, but never optimal to provide incentives exclusively via this technology. Commitment problems then persist and the optimal incentive structure changes dynamically over time with third-party enforcement monotonically increasing in the relative inequality between agents.Limited Commitment, Risk Sharing, Third-party Enforcement

How Flexible Can Inflation Targeting Be? Suggestions for the Future of Canada's Targeting Regime

In Canada, inflation targeting is widely agreed to have been a success story, but questions about how the regime might be fine-tuned in 2011 remain open. This Commentary asks how much discretion an inflation-targeting Bank of Canada can be allowed without compromising the credibility of its low inflation goal.monetary policy, Bank of Canada, inflation targeting

Optimal dynamic risk sharing when enforcement is a decision variable

JEL Classification: C73, D60, D91, K49dynamic risk sharing, enforcement

Differentiability of the Efficient Frontier when Commitment to Risk Sharing is Limited

This paper shows that the value function describing efficient risk sharing with limited commitment is not necessarily differentiable everywhere. We link differentiability of the value function to history dependence of efficient allocations and provide sufficient conditions for both properties.Risk Sharing, Limited Commitment, Differentiability of Efficient Frontier

Risk Sharing through Financial Markets with Endogenous Enforcement of Trades

When people share risk in financial markets, intermediaries provide costly enforcement for most trades and, hence, are an integral part of financial markets' organization. We assess the degree of risk sharing that can be achieved through financial markets when enforcement is based on the threat of exclusion from future trading as well as on costly enforcement intermediaries. Starting from constrained efficient allocations and taking into account the public good character of enforcement we study a Lindahl-equilibrium where people invest in asset portfolios and simultaneously choose to relax their borrowing limits by paying fees to an intermediary who finances the costs of enforcement. We show that financial markets always allow for optimal risk sharing as long as markets are complete, default is prevented in equilibrium and intermediaries provide costly enforcement competitively. In equilibrium, costly enforcement translates into both agent-specific borrowing limits and price schedules that include a separate default premium. Enforcement costs - or, equivalently, default premia - increase borrowing costs, while interest rates per se depend on the change in enforcement over time.Limited Commitment, Enforcement Intermediaries, Lindahl-equilibrium, Endogenous Borrowing Constraints

Time for Stability in Derivatives Markets – a New Look at Central Counterparty Clearing for Securities Markets

The recent financial crisis has driven many plans for improving the stability and resilience of the global financial system. One concept, managing the risk of default in securities or financial derivatives markets through central counterparties, receives scrutiny in this report. The author examines the role centralized clearing parties could play in improving system resilience. These centralized clearing parties are institutions that interpose themselves between counterparties in financial transactions. The author offers a new look at what these institutions could achieve in over-the-counter derivatives trading and short-term funding markets. He places the emphasis on the core services they could provide: the diversification of counterparty risk and the redistribution of default losses among its members.Financial Services, derivatives, securities markets, central counterparty clearing

The Emergence and Future of Central Counterparties

We study the role of a central counterparty (CCP) in controlling counterparty risk. When trading is organized via a centralized exchange with fungible contracts -- as in a futures market -- we show that it is optimal to clear trades via a CCP that uses (i) novation to pool the risk of default and (ii) mutualization of losses to insure against the aggregate cost of default in the form of price risk. We then analyze the design of CCP clearing for over-the-counter (OTC) trades where contracts are customized and, hence, not fungible. A CCP can still offer gains from novation by pooling default risk across all customized contracts. Bargaining in OTC trades leads to an inefficient allocation of default risk across trades. A transfer scheme can alleviate this inefficiency, but necessitates novation being offered by a CCP. Hence, the benefit from CCP clearing for OTC markets goes beyond simple netting as it is a prerequisite for an efficient allocation of default risk in such markets.Central Counterparty, Clearing, Over-the-counter Markets, Novation and Mutualization, Default Risk

The emergence and future of central counterparties

The authors explain why central counterparties (CCPs) emerged historically. With standardized contracts, it is optimal to insure counterparty risk by clearing those contracts through a CCP that uses novation and mutualization. As netting is not essential for these services, it does not explain why CCPs exist. In over-the-counter markets, as contracts are customized and not fungible, a CCP cannot fully guarantee contract performance. Still, a CCP can help: As bargaining leads to an inefficient allocation of default risk relative to the gains from customization, a transfer scheme is needed. A CCP can implement it by offering partial insurance for customized contracts.Risk management ; Over-the-counter markets ; Contracts

Guess what: it's the settlements!

Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trading, clearing and settlement as one operation. We show that such vertical silos can prevent efficiency gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement platforms to be realized. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of settlement are private information, there is no mechanism that achieves the merger of the vertical silos in a way that trading and settlement are produced efficiently after the merger. Furthermore, we show that such an ex-post efficient merger can always be implemented by delegating the operation of settlement platforms to agents. JEL Classification: C73, G20, G34, L22Clearing and Settlement, Horizontal and Vertical Integration, Mechanism Design

Central counterparties

Central counterparties (CCPs) have increasingly become a cornerstone of financial markets infrastructure. We present a model where trades are time-critical, liquidity is limited and there is limited enforcement of trades. We show a CCP novating trades implements efficient trading behaviour. It is optimal for the CCP to face default losses to achieve the efficient level of trade. To cover these losses, the CCP optimally uses margin calls, and, as the default problem becomes more severe, also requires default funds and then imposes position limits